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Summary
Organized crime reinforces its corrupting influence on politics through violent
intimidation. Anti-crime measures that increase the cost of corruption but not of the
exercise of violence might accordingly lead mafia-style organizations to retaliate by
resorting to violence in lieu of bribery. On the other hand, anti-corruption measures
might also induce criminal clans to go inactive, owing to the higher “entry barriers” to
the “business” of influencing politics, which would reduce violence. To determine which
of these possible effects is prevalent, we undertake an empirical assessment of the
impact of city council dissolution for mafia influence as prescribed by Decree Law
164/1991 in discouraging violence against politicians in the period 2010-2019. Our
difference-in-differences analysis shows that in the dissolved municipalities the
enforcement of the Law reduces violence, the effect persisting for two electoral rounds.
Also, we find spillover effects moderating violence in undissolved neighboring
municipalities. These findings are robust to a series of endogeneity tests.
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1

Introduction

Organized crime influences politics by bribery and threats to “induce a given policy maker to
change his action from that preferred by society to that preferred by the group” (Dal Bó and
Di Tella, 2003, p. 1128). For instance, in El Salvador, Mexico and Colombia politicians are
often physically attacked by criminal gangs (see for instance Melnikov et al., 2020; Sviatschi,
2019; Blattman et al., 2020; Daniele et al., 2020). Studies on developed countries have
shown that criminal organizations use violence in the post-electoral period, in view of the
potential ”moral hazard” inherent in politicians’ bargaining with clans (Daniele and Dipoppa,
2017; Daniele, 2019; Dell, 2015), and also before elections, in order to redirect votes to the
candidate they back or discourage qualified adversary candidates from running Olivieri and
Sberna, 2014 ; Alesina et al., 2019; Acemoglu et al., 2020. This pervasive phenomenon shows
the need for empirical assessment of the efficacy of government policies in safeguarding public
security.
Dal Bó et al. (2006) sets out one of the most influential theoretical frameworks for studying
how pressure groups (in our case, criminal organizations) a↵ect politics by optimally choosing
the mix of bribes and threats of violent punishment that determines the level of “state
capture”. These actions have costs, which depend on institutional factors, including the
quality of law enforcement. Stepped-up law enforcement increases the costs of corruption
and strengthens the “entry barriers” to the “business” of influencing politics, thus modifying
the optimal mix of bribery and violence from the mafia’s viewpoint.
More specifically, a measure that increases the cost of corruption (the size of bribes), but
not that of violence (by means of an expansion of police forces) has an ambivalent e↵ect
on organized criminal violence. On the one hand, the upward shock to bribes may induce
criminal clans to discard them in favor of violent punishment, thus raising the level of violence.
This can be seen as a sort of retaliation for the measure increasing the cost of bribes. At
the same time, however, this kind of anti-corruption measure is likely to toughen the entry
barriers to political influence, so that some criminal groups might actually refrain from their
illicit activities and go “out of business”, thereby lowering the level of violent intimidation
and the overall degree of “state capture”. Which of these e↵ects prevails is ultimately an
empirical question; to answer it is the aim of this paper.
The Italian institutional framework is suitable for this purpose. To counter the political
influence of criminal organizations, in 1991 Parliament passed Decree Law 164/1991 (converted with amendments as Law 221 of 22 July 1991, but still known as Law 164). Law
164 prescribes, where there is evidence of organized criminal infiltration of a municipality,
the dismissal of the elected officials and the institution of “compulsory administration” by
three external commissioners designated by the central government. The application of this
measure can be interpreted as an unexpected shock to the cost of corruption for local clans,
in that the commissioners will presumably cut funding for public projects, especially in the
sectors targeted by organized crime, such as manufacturing, waste management and construction (Acconcia et al., 2014). But this is an exclusively administrative act, entailing
neither an expansion of police forces nor increased allocations for public security during the
compulsory administration (Mete, 2009; Cavaliere, 2004).
2
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In this regard, a relevant strand of literature has exploited the shocks to the cost of
corruption produced by the enforcement of Law 164 to examine how organized crime a↵ects
the quality of politicians (Daniele and Geys, 2015; Baraldi et al., 2021; Baraldi et al., 2022)
as well as economic performance and the allocation of public resources in the dissolved
municipalities (Fenizia and Saggio, 2022; Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco, 2021).
In the light of these studies, here we estimate the causal e↵ect (unexplored to date) of
the enforcement of Law 164 on the exercise of violent intimidation by organized crime. We
adopt a di↵erence-in-di↵erences method, comparing the change in number of attacks against
local politicians in dissolved and undissolved municipalities, before and after the dissolution.
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset provided by “Avviso Pubblico”, an NGO that
records the attacks against local politicians carried out from 2010 to 2019 in the regions
of Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily, where practically all the city council dissolutions
occurred.
The estimation results show a considerably sharper reduction, after the period of compulsory administration, in the number of attacks against politicians in the treatment group
of dissolved municipalities compared with the undissolved control group. The results are robust to linear and Poisson FE specifications. The dynamic of the attacks under our preferred
Poisson FE specification shows a pre-treatment coefficient that is not significant (corroborating the common trend assumption) and a sine curve of the post-treatment coefficients.
The enforcement measure a↵ects the number of attacks through the first two elections after
compulsory administration, or over a period of 6-7 years or more. The drop in the number
of attacks after compulsory administration is sharp: 77% at the first election and 65% at the
second, with an overall mean e↵ect (over the entire period after compulsory administration)
of 50%. These results are confirmed by several robustness checks.
To assess the efficacy of this measure in a broader context, we also considered possible
spillover e↵ects on undissolved municipalities in the neighborhood of those dissolved. We find
in fact that the measure had beneficial e↵ects (i.e. a reduction in the number of mafia attacks)
also in those neighboring municipalities; accordingly, we corrected our initial estimates for
the bias generated by the presence of spillovers and modified the regression specification to
comply with the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).
Referring to the ambivalent e↵ect of an increase in the cost of corruption on organized
criminal violence highlighted in Dal Bó et al. (2006), our findings indicate that the enforcement of Law 164 has in fact proved to be e↵ective in toughening the barriers to entry into
the business of political influence, reducing the violent activity of criminal organizations and
the overall degree of “state capture”.
The main challenge for our di↵-in-di↵ analysis is to validate the key identification assumption, namely the strict exogeneity of the treatment to the outcome, given that in principle
city council dissolution itself might well be due to evidence of violence against politicians.
Accordingly, we first focus on possible reverse causality, checking that the number of attacks does not Granger-cause city council dismissal; second, we exclude the municipalities
dissolved because of violent attacks against politicians from the treatment group. We then
address omitted-variable bias, applying a propensity score matching method and controlling
for the repressive action of the central government through the presence of law enforcement
3
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personnel. Finally, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach by exploiting the personal characteristics of the Prefect (Prefetto), the provincial representative of the central
government in charge of the procedure for the dismissal of the infiltrated municipality.
Our tests confirm the exogeneity of dissolution for mafia infiltration with respect to the
number of attacks against local politicians. Interestingly, the IV analysis in the first-stage
regression shows a significant correlation between the age of the Prefect and the probability
of city council dissolution. Possibly, more experienced officers are better at picking up the
warning signs of organized criminal infiltration. Using this latter instrument in a control
function approach, we run a test to confirm the exogeneity of the policy measure studied
here.
This study contributes to the abundant literature on the e↵ects of Law 164/1991, producing novel empirical evidence that its enforcement reduces mafia violence against politicians.
Our results thus complement and extend other recent work that documents the e↵ectiveness
of city council dissolution in favoring better long-run local economic performance (Fenizia
and Saggio, 2022), fostering women’s political empowerment (Baraldi and Ronza, 2022),
enhancing the quality of elected politicians (Daniele and Geys, 2015), and improving tax
collection and the allocation of public funds (Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco, 2021). Moreover,
since some studies have shown that repressive policies bring about a violent reprisal from
criminal organizations (e.g., Calderón et al., 2015; Castillo and Kronick, 2020), our analysis
contributes to the literature studying the e↵ectiveness of non-repressive government measures
in fighting organized crime activities (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2022).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the relevant features
of our theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the institutional framework to show that
Law 164/1991 can be taken as a legitimate treatment and, further, presents the data and
the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical design and
discusses selection bias as a possible threat to our identification strategy. Section 5 reports
the results of our baseline analysis. Section 6 details the econometric analyses we use to
address concerns over treatment endogeneity, and Section 7 deals with the IV approach.
Section 8 reports robustness checks. Section 9 concludes.

2

Conceptual framework

In this Section we derive the empirical hypothesis to be tested, summarizing the relevant
aspects of the model of Dal Bó et al. (2006). In this framework, politicians have discretionary
power over public resources (⇡), which can be re-directed to the pressure group as a lumpsum transfer. To acquire these resources, pressure groups decide whether or not to influence
politicians at a cost, through bribery (b) and credible threats of punishment (p).
In the absence of pressure groups politicians’ income is equal to their salary, but where
pressure groups are active this will be supplemented by bribes (b) and reduced by threats
of punishment (p) and the costs of corruption c (e.g. moral costs or the risk of detection).
Accordingly, active pressure groups will set the optimal bribe o↵er equal to the di↵erence
between the cost of corruption to the politician and the cost of punishment (b⇤ = c

p⇤ ).

To choose the optimal levels of bribes and threats of violent punishment, pressure groups
4
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maximize the following payo↵ function: M axb ,p ⇧(b, p) = [⇡
ject to the constraint

b⇤

= c

p⇤ ,

where

(b)]

(1

)⇢ (p), sub-

and (1

) are respectively the probability

of the politician’s accepting and rejecting the bribe;

(b) and ⇢ (p) respectively are the

costs of delivering a bribe o↵er and carrying out a punishment. The parameters

and ⇢

capture institutional features (i.e law enforcement) that a↵ect the costs of corruption and
punishment.
When the politician accepts the bribe, the pressure group obtains ⇡

(i.e. the fraction

of public resources managed by the politician net of the costs). Otherwise, the pressure group
will bear the cost ⇢ of punishing the politician who rejects the o↵er. Whenever ⇧(b, p)

0,

the pressure group will be active; otherwise it remains inactive and makes no profit. Hence,
setting ⇧(b, p) = 0 allows calculation of the threshold amount of public resources to be
redirected to the pressure group — ⇡
¯ — below which the business of influencing politics is
no longer profitable:

⇡
¯=

1

⇢ (p⇤ ) +

(c

p⇤ )

(1)

⇡
¯ is an inverse measure of “state capture”, i.e. the degree of pressure groups’ influence
on politics; thus, the greater ⇡
¯ , the higher the entry barriers to the business of influencing
politics and the lower the degree of “state capture”. Any change in law enforcement that
a↵ects the costs of “bribery and threats of punishment” will alter the entry barriers and
induce an active pressure group to modify its optimal mix of bribes and threats.
Intriguingly, for this study an increase in the cost of a bribe (an increase in

) has a

theoretically ambivalent e↵ect on the level of criminal violence. On the one hand, if a pressure
group is active both before and after the increase in

, it will substitute punishments for

bribes, since the relative cost of the former diminishes: that is, the active pressure group will
step up its violent intimidation as a form of retaliation for the higher costs of bribery. On the
other hand, an increase in the cost of bribes sti↵ens the barriers to entry into the business of
influencing politics as such, as measured by the increase in ⇡
¯ . Some pressure groups within
the range of variation of ⇡
¯ would earn negative profits and will accordingly refrain from
seeking influence either through bribery or through threats. If enough groups lie within this
range, overall the rise in

will decrease the resort to threats of violent punishment. This

is implied by Proposition 6 in Dal Bó et al. (2006). Which e↵ect prevails is ultimately an
empirical question; and this is what our analysis investigates.
City council dissolution by enforcement of Law 164/1991 delivers an exogenous shock
to the cost to pressure groups of making a bribe. Compulsory administration by external
commissioners will presumably bring a sudden cut in funding for public projects, especially
in the sectors targeted by organized crime such as manufacturing, waste management and
construction (Acconcia et al., 2014). The Law, that is, is intended to lower the level of
corruption by imposing an economic cost on organized crime’s exercise of political influence,
while it does not entail any sti↵ening of formal deterrence by such measures as expansion of
police forces or increases in funds allocated to public safety.
In the logic of Dal Bó et al. (2006), to the extent that city council dismissal increases

5
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the cost of corruption, it can curb the overall use of violent intimidation only if it induces
enough criminal groups to go inactive. So if we are to assess the efficacy of Law 164/1991 in
strengthening the barriers to influencing politics, empirical analysis of the e↵ect on violent
intimidation by organized crime is essential.

3

Institutional background and data

3.1

The anti-mafia measure

Law 164/1991 prescribes the dissolution of a city council upon evidence of direct or indirect
links with organized crime that compromise the local administration’s neutrality and autonomy, and more generally public safety. Introduced in response to the growing influence of
organized crime on local administrations in the 1980s, the Law was designed to prevent or
reverse criminal control of public procurement, public works, urban plants, and housing.
Dissolution entails the replacement of the mayor, the city council, and the executive
board with commissioners appointed by the central government and drawn from outside the
local area. They run the municipality for 12 to 24 months before new elections are held to
reinstate a legal city council and restore public safety. In detail, the activity of the compulsory
administration consists in an unexpected reduction in public investment projects, chiefly in
the sectors targeted by organized crime (manufacturing, waste management, construction).
The Law lays down a rigid procedure from the initial discovery of evidence of mafia
infiltration to the dissolution decree. Typically, there is some advance warning in the form
of independent judicial or police inquiries.1 This evidence is reported to the Prefect, the
provincial representative of the Ministry of the Interior, who, by virtue of powers of inquiry,
can name a commission (Commissione d’Accesso) to investigate the extent of permeability
of the local government to organized crime.
This investigation is kept secret until completed, or for a maximum of three months.
That is, the conduct of local administrators and criminal organizations cannot be influenced
by the procedure while it is under way. Once the investigation is concluded, the report
of the Commissione d’Accesso will form the basis of the Prefect’s proposal for city council
dissolution, which is submitted to the Ministry of the Interior for final decision. The outcome
of the procedure, in other words, is independent of the partisan political dynamics of the
municipality (Mete, 2009).
The dissolution provision is preventive, in that the replacement of local politicians by
outside commissioners is intended to prevent future crimes in the public administration rather
than prosecute past ones. Thus the evidence of links between civil servants and organized
crime does not necessarily have to show a crime in order to trigger the procedure. In fact,
the reports to the Prefect with a view to dissolution decrees very commonly involve evidence
not of crimes but of personal relationships of kinship or friendship between local politicians
and members of criminal organizations. The main triggers of the inspection procedure by
the Commissione d’Accesso turn out to be electoral agreements, electoral participation of
individuals linked to local clans, the exchange of packets of votes, and shared economic
1

This is the reason for controlling for repressive action by government (Section 6.2.2).

6
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1373

8

Baraldi et al.: Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of

interests between politicians and criminal organizations.
For the purposes of our study, the intimidation of local politicians by organized crime
— killings, physical attacks, threatening letters — may be a factor in activating the Commissione d’Accesso’s inquiry. This is plainly a threat to our identification strategy, as municipalities dissolved owing to evidence of (violent) intimidation are self-selected into the
treatment group, creating a problem of reverse causation, since we may be unable to determine the causal link between the council dissolution and the variation in the number of
attacks against local politicians.
However, we do not believe that this imperfection seriously compromises our analysis.
The relationship between the number of attacks and the probability of dissolution is likely to
be positive, while it is reasonable to expect a negative sign for the inverse correlation between
council dissolution and subsequent attacks on politicians. This means that the self-selection
might bias the estimates of the causal link between dissolution and number of attacks towards
zero. In other words, our baseline analysis would indicate the lower bound of the downward
e↵ect of city government dismissals on criminal attacks on local politicians.
Moreover, violent intimidation certainly cannot be taken as unequivocal evidence of collusion with local clans like the above-mentioned cases of electoral agreement, the delivery of
packets of votes, and shared economic interests. Indeed, as the administrative courts have
rightly pointed out, the simple fact of local roots of organized crime and criminal violence
does not prove a connection with the local government such as to trigger an inspection procedure. Thus, acts of intimidation can be considered as a sign of city council permeability
to mafia infiltration only insofar as they are combined with evidence of collusive behaviour.
For example, the municipalities of Bagnara Calabra and Delianuova were dissolved because
local clans repeatedly attacked the majority of the city council with the complicity of its
minority.2
As a consequence, relatively few of the municipalities where attacks against local administrators occur undergo an inspection procedure.
On the empirical level, this means that there should be no correlation between the regional
distribution of the dissolutions (concentrated in the South) and that of per capita attacks
on politicians (widespread throughout Italy). We test this hypothesis in Section 3.2. For
more thorough statistical analysis of this issue, we conduct a number of endogeneity tests
(Sections 6 and 7).

3.2

Data

We construct a dataset of threats and violence against local politicians in Italy from 2010 to
2019. Official sources of data about attacks against politicians are not available; like Daniele
and Dipoppa (2017), we use the yearly reports of “Avviso Pubblico”, a non-governmental
organization that collects daily media reports of threats and attacks directed against Italian
politicians. The violent actions are sorted by type of attack and type of politician, in each
of the municipalities where they occur.
2

Similar cases can be found in a number of other reports on dissolved municipalities. On this issue see
Marotta (2019).
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“Avviso Pubblico” distinguishes 20 types of attack3 and 11 types of politician targeted
for attack.4
According to this source, Italy counted 4448 attacks against politicians from 2010 to 2019.
Considering only city council politicians (deputy mayor, former mayor, relative of politician,
candidate, alderman, city councillor, city or municipal company manager, mayor) the total
is 3857. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the attacks by region. For each
region we calculate the mean number of attacks (in the period 2010-2019), reported in the
first column of Table A.1. This mean is divided by the average regional population in the
same period to produce the average number of attacks per capita, shown in Column 2 of
Table A.1 and in Figure 1, which groups regions in classes from very low to very high (see
the note on Figure 1 for details).
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of attacks against politicians

Notes. The figure shows the regional averages of attacks against local politicians per capita. Regions are grouped
according to the following range of values: Very Low: 0.0006357-0.0019019; Low: 0.0021064-0.0022924; Medium:
0.0027108-0.0022926; High: 0.0031238-0.0037061; Very High: 0.0045485-0.0157233.

The per capita measure allows a more meaningful comparison of the intensity of the attacks
between regions of di↵ering population. Figure 1 shows that attacks against politicians are
widespread throughout the country. That is, organized crime is now active well beyond the
3
1) Setting car on fire, 2) Setting City Hall or municipal property on fire, 3) Threatening letter, 4)
Threatening letter containing bullets, 5) Verbal or telephone threats, 6) Physical assault, 7) Setting home on
fire, 8) Shootings against City Hall, 9) Homicide, 10) Threatening messages on the family tomb, 11) Killing
of domestic animals, 12) Delivery of an animal head in a box, 13) Shootings against car, 14) Leaving dead
animals or their parts in front of home, 15) Damage or robbery in City Hall, 16) Felling of trees on private
property, 17) Physical assault in public places, 18) Bullets in front of home or City Hall, 19) Threatening
messages on walls of home or City Hall, 20) Bombing of home or City Hall.
4
1) Regional councillor, 2) Regional president, 3) Deputy mayor, 4) Former mayor, 5) Relative of politician,
6) Candidate, 7) Alderman, 8) City councillor, 9) City or municipal company managers, 10) Mayor, 11)
Representative of other institutions or entities.

8
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southern regions where it originated. For instance, northern regions like Valle D’Aosta have
become a strategic territory for the business of the ’ndrangheta, a criminal organization that
originated in Calabria.
Table 1 shows the distribution of city council dismissals by region: from 2010 to 2019
they totalled 120. The regions of Campania, Calabria, Sicily and Puglia count 115 dismissals
(in 108 municipalities),5 or 95.8% of the total. For the greatest possible homogeneity in the
sample of municipalities (which helps to reduce estimation bias due to unobservables), the
analysis is limited to these four regions.
Table 1: City council dismissal by regions
Region
Calabria
Campania
Sicily
Puglia
Piedmont
Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Liguria
Rest of Italy
Total

City council dismissals
59
21
25
10
2
1
0
120

Note. The table displays the number of administrations dissolved in the period 2010-2019 by region. Lombardy,
Emilia Romagna, and Liguria had 1 dissolution each.

As noted, the possible reverse causality between the number of attacks and dissolution for
mafia infiltration is a serious concern. The issue of endogeneity will be treated extensively
in the next sections, but we begin to address this concern here with a t-test comparing the
per capita mean of attacks in Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily (group 1) and in the
rest of the country (group 2). The results (in Table 2) show that there is no statistical
di↵erence between the means of the two sets of regions. This suggests that while city council
dissolutions for mafia are concentrated in Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily, no such
concentration is found for attacks on politicians, which precludes correlation between the
two variables.
Table 2: t-test
Group
1
2
Di↵erence (p-value)

All politicians/Pop
0.0053
0.0033
0.0019 (0.61)

City council politicians/Pop
0.0038
0.0025
0.0012 (0.52)

Note. The table displays the mean di↵erence test (t-test) between regions in group 1 and 2 of the mean of per
capita attacks on politicians. Group 1 comprises Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily, group 2 the rest of the
Italian regions. P-value is in brackets. The mean is calculated over regions and time (2010-2019) within each
group.

3.3

Variables

The dependent variable in this empirical analysis is the number of attacks against local
politicians as reported by “Avviso Pubblico”. Figures 2 and 3 sort the data by type of
attack and type of politician in our four regions.
5

7 municipalities in our database were dissolved more than once.
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Figure 2: Types of attacks. 2010-2019

Notes. The Figure shows the types of attack against politicians. 2010-2019.

From 2010 to 2019, the most common types of attack were arson targeted at cars (345) or the
City Hall or other municipal properties (319), followed by verbal or telephone threats (282).
A non-negligible number of cases also involved threatening letters (189 + 107). Physical
assaults and arson against politicians’ homes too were reported in a substantial number
of cases (respectively 175 and 117). Other types of attack are not so frequent; the worst,
homicide, registered 21 victims. In the baseline specification of our empirical model, the
dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians; we provide further
evidence of the findings in the sub-samples of threats and violent intimidation as well as in
that of the more visible attacks.
Figure 3: Victims of attack. 2010-2019

Notes. The Figure shows the types of victim of mafia attacks. 2010-2019.

Figure 3 shows 666 attacks against mayors (almost 32% of the total). City councillors,
aldermen and deputy mayors display lower risk. The last category in the figure, namely
policemen and managers in city government or other public facilities, counts about 21% of
10
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the attacks. Attacks against regional presidents and councillors are far less frequent. As is
observed by Daniele and Dipoppa (2017), national politicians are not targeted by organized
criminal violence, presumably thanks to their stronger protection owing to their greater
public exposure.
Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the trend in the mean number of attacks over the years
by type of attack (graph B.1a) and type of politician (graph B.1b). Graph B.1a merges the
types of attack into two categories: Threats and Violence (see note to Figure B.1 for details).
The number of Threats appears relatively constant over time, while actual Violence peaked
in 2016, and with it the total number of attacks.
Graph B.1b merges the types of victim into City council politicians and Other politicians
(see note to Figure B.1 for details). Clearly, the prime targets of mafia attacks are City
council politicians. Both graph B.1a and graph B.1b in Figure B.1 show a downward spike
of the attacks in 2012. As the National Coordinator of “Avviso Pubblico” explains, however,
this is deceptive. The low value actually reflects the organization’s lack of human resources
that year, so that the data were collected ex-post via internet search only. Given this problem,
we exclude the year 2012 from the analysis.
As Daniele and Dipoppa (2017) observes, the number of attacks on local politicians
surveyed by “Avviso Pubblico” could be a↵ected by a measurement error, in that the violence
reported might be the work of private citizens and not necessarily organized crime. However,
the parliamentary report by Moro et al. (2015), which documents the connection between
attacks on politicians and organized crime using both open-source and restricted-access data,
estimates that attacks driven by personal motives constitute a tiny fraction of the total.
Moreover, since organized crime deploys violence either to a↵ect election results or for
bargaining with the politicians elected, the attacks cannot be random but should be concentrated at election times. And research provides robust evidence that violent intimidation
by organized crime is in fact concentrated around elections (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2017;
Alesina et al., 2019), which corroborates the hypothesis that the attacks are perpetrated by
organized crime rather than private citizens. Nevertheless, the estimates of the linear models
of attacks against politicians are robust to (consistent with) this kind of measurement error
in the dependent variable.
Our regressor is the application of Law 164/1991 to dissolve a city council upon evidence
of the infiltration of local politics by organized crime. Figure B.2 in Appendix B shows the
number of dissolutions for mafia by year (graph B.2a) and by province (graph B.2b).
Except in 2012 and 2017, dissolutions are fairly evenly distributed; the same goes for
provincial distribution in the four regions of interest: only the province of Reggio Calabria
counts more than 30 dissolutions, while 4 provinces had none. We take this into account in
the empirical analysis.

4

Empirical design

We create a yearly panel of all the municipalities in Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily
from 2010 to 2019. This panel structure, together with the exogeneity of the shock for
organized crime due to the application Law 164/1991, makes it possible to isolate the ef11
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fect of the measure from any time-specific features, such as long-term trends and seasonal
patterns. Further, the municipal-level fixed e↵ects account for possible local factors. We
take a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach. We record the number of attacks before and after
city council dissolutions for mafia infiltration, which is our treatment, in both dissolved and
undissolved municipalities (i.e. in the treated and control groups). The baseline specification
is the following event study model (subscript i for municipalities, t for election years):
Yit =

+n
X

t= n

⌫ t · Dt + ↵i +

t

+ P opit + ✏it

(2)

Yit is the outcome variable in municipality i at year t. Dt is the set of event-time dummies,
which take the value of 1 only for dissolved municipalities if year t is k periods before/after
the dissolution. The omitted category, D0 , is the year of the dissolution; the remaining ⌫t
coefficients measure the e↵ects in the period before and after the application of Law 164 (t0 ).
In all the estimations we control for 1) municipality fixed e↵ects (↵i ); 2) time fixed e↵ects
( t ); 3) municipal population (P opit ). ✏it is the idiosyncratic error term.
Since the dependent variable is the occurrence of an attack, the count of events has a large
portion of 0 and a skewed distribution as shown in Table A.3 (Appendix A). Consequently we
specify the outcome variable in two ways: 1) as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an attack
takes place in municipality i in year t and 0 otherwise; 2) as the total number of attacks in
municipality i in year t. In the first case, we estimate eq. 2 by a linear probability model; in
the second case, we use a Poisson model with fixed e↵ects and standard errors clustered at
the municipality level, which is more suitable for count data. Clustered standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and they allow for consistent inference in
a di↵-in-di↵ framework (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Assuming the exogeneity of the explanatory variables, the conditional quasi-maximum
likelihood estimation of Poisson models (Wooldridge, 2010; Cameron and Trivedi, 2013) is
consistent even when the assumption of a Poisson distribution of events is not correct (i.e.
over- or under-dispersion). Municipality fixed e↵ects control for heterogeneity in the crosssection dimension and account for unobserved time-invariant factors that could engender
omitted-variable bias. Time fixed e↵ects account for unobserved year-specific events that
a↵ect all municipalities. In Poisson FE estimations, the coefficients are interpreted as an
elasticity, according to the following expression: Exp(coef ) 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).
The validity of the empirical design requires satisfaction of the common trend assumptions, which can be tested by analysis of the pre-treatment dummies of the event study model
in eq. 2 (Mora and Reggio, 2019). The event study estimates also permit assessment of the
dynamic e↵ect of the measure, i.e. the trajectories of the attacks in treated and untreated
municipalities in each year after the dissolution.
We also estimate the mean impact of the measure using the following specification:
Yit =

1 P olicyit

+ ↵i +

t

+ P opit +

0

Xit + ✏it

(3)

where Yit is, as above, the number of attacks in municipality i in year t. The regressor is
P olicyit , which is equal to 1 for treated municipalities in all the years between compulsory
12
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administration and 2019 and to 0 in the period from 2010 to the year of the dissolution;
for municipalities in the control group, it is 0 for the entire period 2010-2019.

1

in eq. 3

measures the average treatment e↵ect on the number of attacks against politicians. Since
municipalities are defined as receiving treatment in the year they are dissolved, we need to
exclude the 5 municipalities whose administrations were dissolved in 2010 in order to have
at least one observation (a 0) before the dissolution.
For our analysis it is important to control for the characteristics of the politicians in
office, which we specify in the vector of control variables (Xit ). These are a dummy for
university degree of the mayor (Mayor degree) taking the value of 1 if the mayor has at least
a university degree and 0 otherwise; a dummy taking value 1 if at least one city councillor
has a university degree and 0 otherwise (Councillors degree); a dummy taking value 1 if at
least one alderman in the executive board has a university degree and 0 otherwise (Aldermen
degree); and the number of female councillors (Female councilors) and aldermen (Female
aldermen).
It is also important to control for municipal context variables such as the average educational attainment of women and men (Female education and Male education) and the female
and the male unemployment rates (Female unemployment and Male unemployment).6 The
inclusion of control variables o↵ers an indication of the relevance of omitted-variable bias:
where these additional controls have only marginal impact on the treatment coefficient (Policy), a causal interpretation of the results is justified. Moreover, the possible endogeneity of
government dissolution with respect to the number of attacks is controlled for by covariates
as well as municipality and time fixed e↵ects.

4.1

Selection bias

A number of selection bias issues may arise. First, the regular term in office of the mayor and
the council is five years;7 under certain circumstances — permanent impediment, removal,
lapse of appointment, or death preventing the mayor or the majority of the council from
performing their duties; violation of the Constitution or national law; failure to pass the
budget — the mandate may be terminated early and new elections held. The large number
of possible reasons for early termination of a municipal council could make it more likely
for an infiltrated municipality to go undetected and therefore sorted into the control rather
than the treatment group. We address this type of selection bias in the main analysis by
excluding all councils terminated early from the control group.
Second, as is observed in the previous Section 3.2, 7 municipalities were dissolved more
than once. To avoid post-treatment bias, in Section 5 we control for this by excluding them.
Third, no municipalities in the provinces of Avellino, Barletta-Andria-Trani, Benevento
or Enna were dissolved (graph B.2b in Figure B.2, Appendix B). Municipalities within a
province are likely to be similarly a↵ected by shocks to provincial GDP or to the provincial
government.8 Finally, if criminal organizations are not the sole perpetrators of intimidation
6

These data are taken from the censuses of 2001 and 2011.
Until 2000, shortened to four years by Law 81/1993, art.2; restored to five by Legislative Decree 267/2000,
art.51).
8
Acconcia et al. (2014) show that provinces in which at least one city council was dissolved for mafia
7
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and attacks, the impact of the dissolution measure should be smaller where mafias are less
active. In order to control for all these aspects, in Section 5, we exclude these provinces from
the analysis.
Fourth, the “Avviso Pubblico” data on threats and attacks against politicians are drawn
from media reports. That is, our dependent variable captures only the attacks that are
denounced by politicians, so possible bias due to media under-reporting could be a concern.
However, as Daniele and Dipoppa (2017) note, this is not a serious danger: as in most
cities attacks against politicians are uncommon, we can assume that when they occur, they
generally do get reported. We address this issue in Subsection 8.2 by performing estimations
on the restricted sample of the most sensational attacks — those that can be seen by people
other than the victim and, thus, are unlikely to be hidden.9

5

The results

We first estimate eq. 2 and calculate the trajectory of the attacks on politicians year-by-year
before and after the implementation of the anti-mafia dissolution measure. In the baseline
specification, the dependent variable is the total number of attacks against all the categories
of politician reported by “Avviso Pubblico”, in each municipality and in each year from 2010
to 2019.
The results are displayed in Figure 4 and Table 3 (to save space, the latter shows only the
significant coefficients). Table 3 shows (linear) panel FE estimations where the dependent
variables are a dummy for the probability of an attack (Column 1) and the total number of
attacks (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 estimate a Poisson FE model.10 All regressions present
robust standard errors, which are clustered at municipal level,11 except for the estimations
shown in Column 4, clustered at province level.
The graphs from 4a to 4d in Figure 4 depict the results reported from Columns 1 to 4 in
Table 3. Overall, the coefficients for the pre-treatment period are not significantly di↵erent
from zero, which corroborates the common trend assumption. In all the graphs the coefficient
immediately after the dissolution (corresponding to the period of compulsory administration)
is negative but not statistically di↵erent from zero. The downward e↵ect of the measure first
appears at t0 + 2, i.e. the year in which compulsory administration ends and a new local
administration is elected.
In Column 1 of Table 3, at t0 + 2 we observe a reduction of 10.8 percentage points (p.p.)
in the probability of an attack in the treatment relative to the control municipalities. This
di↵erential reduction becomes more pronounced at t0 + 3, when it peaks at 13.1 p.p., before
the dependent variable turns back upward. Considering the total number of attacks (Column
2), the linear model shows decreases of 38.1 and 32.6 p.p. in the treated units in the periods
infiltration reduced their total investment in infrastructure by more than those with none.
9
This test excludes all threatening letters and menaces and includes, for example, arson against City Halls,
shootings at politicians’ homes, bombings and homicides.
10
The substantial reduction in the number of observations is due to Poisson log-likelihood maximization,
which in a model with fixed e↵ects excludes the units that always have zero values of the dependent variable
for the entire period.
11
To compute robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in Poisson FE model we use the Stata
command xtpqml.

14
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1373

16

Baraldi et al.: Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of

t0 + 2 and t0 + 3, respectively. The downward e↵ect of the measure is observed again at
t0 + 7, in the run-up to the second election after compulsory administration, with a negative
and significant coefficient of about 31 p.p.
Our preferred Poisson FE estimation shows a definite long-lasting e↵ect of the dissolution
measure on mafia attacks. In Column 3 of Table 4, the strongest e↵ect of the measure appears
at t0 + 2 with a decrease of 76.7% (e

1.459

- 1) in the number of attacks after compulsory

administration compared to the control group of never-dissolved municipalities. The e↵ect
of the measure is increasing, though not statistically significant, up to t0 + 5. When new
elections are held between t0 + 6 and t0 + 7, the attacks still decrease more in the treatment
than in the control group; the magnitude of the estimated e↵ect in that period is smaller,
with decreases of 46% (at t0 + 6) and 65% (at t0 + 7).
These results are in line with the evidence provided by Daniele and Dipoppa (2017) and
Alesina et al. (2019) that in areas with a strong presence of organized crime the strategic
use of violence against local politicians is concentrated in the weeks around the elections.
Our findings thus indicate that the enforcement of Law 164/1991 is e↵ective in discouraging intimidation of politicians exactly when this is of the greatest strategic importance to
organized crime in its drive to influence politics.

15
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Figure 4: Event study graphs
(a) Linear (0/1) estimates

(b) Linear estimates

(c) Poisson estimates

(d) Poisson estimates

Note. The graphs report coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Graph 4a shows
the linear probability model estimates where the dependent variable is the probability of being a target of
violence. Graph 4b shows the linear probability model estimates where the dependent variable is the total
number attacks. Graphs 4c and 4d show the Poisson FE model estimates where the dependent variable is the
total number attacks. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level except for the estimations in graph 4d,
where they are clustered at provincial level. Dots refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals.
The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time dummy variables for 7 years
before and 8 years after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality FE, year FE and the resident
population. Period: 2010-2019.

The e↵ect is long-lasting (for at least the first two council terms after compulsory administration), as shown by the u-shaped curve of the attacks, which means that the average impact
of the policy can be examined by estimating eq. 3; the results are displayed in Columns 5 8, Table 3 (the four empirical specifications reproduce those of Columns 1 - 4.).
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Table 3: Baseline estimates
Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 6
t0 + 7
t0 + 8

Linear estimation
(1)
(2)
Attacks(0/1) No. Attacks
-0.108**
-0.381***
(0.0435)
(0.141)
-0.131***
-0.326*
(0.0503)
(0.173)
-0.0195
-0.176
(0.0561)
(0.149)
-0.0334
-0.312*
(0.0736)
(0.161)
-0.0327
-0.406*
(0.0814)
(0.225)

Poisson FE estimation
(3)
(4)
No. Attacks No. Attacks
-1.459***
-1.459***
(0.485)
(0.489)
-0.862*
-0.862*
(0.506)
(0.505)
-0.618*
-0.618
(0.349)
(0.395)
-0.918**
-0.918**
(0.405)
(0.441)
-1.052**
-1.052*
(0.496)
(0.599)

Policy
Pop

Observations
R-squared
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

0.0118**
(0.00478)

0.123***
(0.0375)

0.00985
(0.00992)

0.00985
(0.0103)

16,002
0.015
1,606
Yes
Yes

16,002
0.019
1,606
Yes
Yes

5,731

5,731

575
Yes
Yes

575
Yes
Yes

Linear estimation
(5)
(6)
Attacks(0/1) No. Attacks

Poisson FE estimation
(7)
(8)
No. Attacks
No. Attacks

-0.0747***
(0.0264)
0.0120**
(0.00486)

-0.243**
(0.0972)
0.0902*
(0.0478)

-0.700***
(0.201)
0.0106
(0.0102)

-0.700***
(0.266)
0.0106
(0.0104)

16,002
0.012
1,606
Yes
Yes

16,002
0.014
1,606
Yes
Yes

5,731

5,731

575
Yes
Yes

575
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to eq. 2 (Columns 1 - 4) and eq. 3 (Columns 5 - 8). Columns 1 and 5 show the linear probability model
estimates where the dependent variable is the probability of being a target of violence; in Columns 2 and 6 the dependent variable is the total number attacks.
Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 show the Poisson FE model estimates where the dependent variable is the total number attacks. Standard errors are clustered at municipal
level except for the estimations in Columns 4 and 8 where they are clustered at provincial level. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from
the dissolution onward and 0 in previous years. In estimating eq 2 we include event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 8 years after the dissolution; the
omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). All regressions include municipality FE and year FE (coefficients not reported). Standard errors are in brackets.
The number of observations in the Poisson FE model as in Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 is reduced to 5,731 because 1,033 groups (10,291 obs) were dropped, having all
zero outcomes. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).

One sees at a glance that the negative sign of the treatment coefficient (Policy) is robust
across specifications, confirming that the dissolution of a local administration for mafia infiltration reduces attacks against local politicians. As to the probability of an attack, the
enforcement of the Law lowers the probability of an attack by 7.47 p.p. (Column 5). The
linear probability model estimated in Column 6 confirms the negative sign of Policy, with a
magnitude of about 25 p.p. The Poisson coefficients suggest that the measure diminishes the
occurrence of attacks by 50% (Columns 7 and 8). The significance of the main coefficient
remains strong (at 1%) when we cluster the standard errors at province level (Column 8)
rather than municipal level (Column 7).
Poisson FE estimates serve to control for any omitted time-invariant variables, but the
algorithm of likelihood maximization drops the many municipalities that have zero outcomes
in every year. However, this phenomenon does not occur when we perform the Poisson RE
estimations (Table A.4 in Appendix A). These regression models include the cross-section
level of education and the unemployment rate. The main coefficient remains negative and
significant at conventional levels with an average e↵ect of 37% (Column 1). It is robust to
the inclusion of province FE, and significance increases when controls are included (Column
3). The estimates indicate no significant impact of the female and male unemployment rates;
however, the female education level has a positive and significant impact on the number of
attacks, while the male education level has a negative sign.
The downward e↵ect of city council dissolution on violence against local politicians raises
the issue of the trade-o↵ posited in the model of Dal Bó et al. (2006). It o↵ers support for
the hypothesis that in the Italian situation the application of a measure that increases the
cost of bribery — Law 164 — discourages criminal groups from seeking to influence politics
and thereby lowers the overall level of violence.
As noted in Subsection 3.3, the downward spike in attacks depicted in 2012 was due
17
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to a lack of data collection by “Avviso Pubblico”. Accordingly, 2012 is excluded from the
analysis, but the results are unchanged (see Table A.5 and Figure B.3).
Moreover, in Section 4 we underscored the importance of controlling for the characteristics of local politicians, in particular education and gender. The theoretical model of Dal Bó
et al. (2006) and its empirical testing by Daniele and Geys (2015) show how organized crime
negatively a↵ects the quality of politicians, as proxied by education level. Another important
strand of literature documents how gender matters for the level of political corruption (Beaman et al., 2009, Brollo and Troiano, 2016, Dollar et al., 2001, Jha and Sarangi, 2018, Swamy
et al., 2001). Accordingly, we re-estimate eq. 2, now adding the foregoing control variables:
Mayor degree, the Councillors degree, the Aldermen degree, No. Female councillors, and
No. Female aldermen.
The Poisson FE estimation results, reported in graph 5a in Figure 5 and in Column 1
of Table 4, show that city council dissolution reduces acts of violence by mafias sharply in
the period around the election of the first new government after compulsory administration
(between t0 + 2 and t0 + 3) and around the next election (between t0 + 6 and t0 + 7).
Importantly, controlling for politicians’ characteristics does not alter the dynamics of the
dependent variable. Only the dummies for the mayor’s education and for the number of
female aldermen appear to have a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable.
Column 5 shows the mean impact of the measure when the relevant controls are included:
the coefficient of Policy remains negative and highly significant, if somewhat smaller in
magnitude than in the baseline estimates.
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Figure 5: Poisson event study estimates
(a) Control variables

(b) Early termination

(c) Multiple dissolutions

(d) Province without dissolutions

Note. The graphs report coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2 by a Poisson
FE model. The dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians. Graph 5a shows
the estimates including controls for politicians’ characteristics: Mayor degree, Councillors degree, Aldermen
degree, Female councillors and Female aldermen. Graph 5b shows estimates excluding municipalities where
an administration was terminated early for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration. Graph 5c shows estimates
excluding municipalities dissolved more than once. Graph 5d shows estimates excluding municipalities in
provinces where there was no dissolution for mafia. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots
refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ).
We include event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 8 years after the dissolution. All regressions
include municipality FE, year FE and resident population.

As is observed in Section 4.1, there could be a problem of selection bias in cases of early
terminations for reasons unrelated to mafia, municipalities dissolved more than once, and
those located in provinces with no city council dissolutions. We address this problem in
graphs 5b, 5c and 5d of Figure 5 for the event study dummies and in Columns 2, 3 and 4/6,
7 and 8 of Table 4, for the mean impact estimates. The results show a very similar path of
the attacks and again corroborate the average negative e↵ect of the measure.
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Table 4: Poisson FE estimates
Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 6
t0 + 7

(1)
Attacks
-1.178**
(0.494)
-0.860*
(0.490)
-0.654*
(0.345)
-0.886**
(0.399)

(2)
Attacks
-1.102*
(0.562)
-1.656**
(0.698)
-0.957*
(0.522)
-0.720
(0.609)

(3)
Attacks
-1.365***
(0.495)
-0.807
(0.525)
-0.735**
(0.356)
-0.838**
(0.417)

(4)
Attacks
-1.425***
(0.483)
-0.809
(0.512)
-0.451
(0.356)
-0.768*
(0.423)

Policy
Mayor degree
Councillors degree
Aldermen degree
No. female councillors
No. female aldermen
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(5)
Attacks

(6)
Attacks

(7)
Attacks

(8)
Attacks

-0.671**
(0.294)

-0.690***
(0.208)

-0.559***
(0.212)

0.0109
(0.0104)

0.0104
(0.0102)

0.00938
(0.0105)

3,941
396
Yes
Yes

5,681
570
Yes
Yes

5,126
516
Yes
Yes

0.228**
(0.0959)
0.232
(0.604)
-0.0196
(0.107)
-0.000972
(0.0174)
0.124***
(0.0414)
0.00726
(0.00862)

0.0106
(0.0104)

0.00969
(0.00990)

0.00885
(0.0103)

-0.516**
(0.227)
0.242**
(0.0957)
0.249
(0.601)
-0.00562
(0.108)
-3.42e-05
(0.0174)
0.123***
(0.0415)
0.00788
(0.00889)

5,705
574
Yes
Yes

3,941
396
Yes
Yes

5,681
570
Yes
Yes

5,126
516
Yes
Yes

5,705
574
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to the Poisson FE model in eq. 2 (in Columns 1 - 4) and in eq. 3 (in Columns
5 - 8). The dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians. Columns 1 and 5 show estimates adding controls for
politicians’ characteristics (Mayor degree, Councillors degree, Aldermen degree, No. Female councillors and No. Female aldermen).
Columns 2 and 6 show estimations excluding municipalities terminated early for non-mafia reasons. Columns 3 and 7 show estimations
excluding municipalities dissolved more than once. Columns 4 and 8 show estimations excluding municipalities in provinces with no
mafia-related dissolutions. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from the dissolution onward and 0 in the others. In
estimating eq 2 we include event-time dummy variables for up to 7 years before and 8 years after the dissolution; the omitted category
is the year of dissolution (t0 ). Coefficients of municipality FE and year FE are not reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and ***
(1% level).

5.1

Negative weights

The most recent econometric literature has shown that in a staggered di↵-in-di↵ design, when
the e↵ects of the measure are dynamic (as in our setting), the coefficient of the average treatment e↵ect (Policy in Table 3) represents a weighted average of these dynamic e↵ects; and
some of the weights can be negative, generating possible bias in the estimates (GoodmanBacon, 2021). When the treatment e↵ect is not constant over time, negative weights arise
because the already-treated units move into the control group, so that changes in their treatment e↵ects over time are no longer factored into the di↵-in-di↵ estimate. De Chaisemartin
and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) propose a test to compute the number of negative weights in this
setting.12 The test shows that the number of negatively-weighted Average Treatment E↵ects
on the Treated (ATTs) is 0, suggesting that the heterogeneity is chiefly between treated
and never-treated municipalities. Therefore, our initial estimates are not biased due to the
negative weight issue.
12

We use the twowayfeweights Stata command, developed by De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020),
for linear estimations.
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6

About the exogeneity of the dissolution measure

The main assumption of the di↵-in-di↵ methodology is the strict exogeneity of the policy
with respect to the dependent variable. In this section, we tackle this methodological issue
by addressing two important threats to our identification strategy: reverse causality and
omitted variable bias. All Tables with the prefix “A.” are in Appendix A. All Figures with
the prefix “B.” are in Appendix B.

6.1

Reverse causality

In principle, any policy intervention could be the response to some problem of public life.
Hence, although (as argued earlier) the motivations for dissolution are much broader in
scope, city council dissolution could be justified also by violent actions against politicians by
organized crime . The event study model eq. 2 lends itself to a first check of the exogeneity
of the treatment through a test of the Granger causality hypothesis (Granger, 1969). We also
search for further evidence of Granger causality by regressing the treatment dummy — city
council dissolution — on contemporaneous and past levels of attacks. Moreover, we estimate
the baseline model excluding the municipalities where the dissolution procedure was initiated
explicitly owing to attacks against politicians.
6.1.1

Granger causality

Granger causality implies that the treatment is not anticipated by current attacks on politicians. Hence, city council dissolution should come before violence and threats, not after.
Granger causality does not imply policy exogeneity if the government intervention is influenced by the expectation of future attacks against politicians. However, such behavior on the
part of the institutions in charge of the decision can be easily ruled out. Indeed, council dissolution means that the mayor and councillors lose their legally held office, and in democracy
the rule of law does not admit any role for expectations in legal decisions.
The estimation of the dynamic model eq. 2 shows that the policy intervention Granger
causes the reduction in the number of criminal attacks, because the coefficients of the event
time dummies t0 , t0

1, t0

2 are not statistically significant.

The exogeneity of policy further implies that current and past values of the outcome do
not explain the policy intervention. Table A.6 shows results of the regression of the dummy
Policy on the total number of attacks in municipality i at times t, t
1) and at times t

1 and t

1 and t

2 (in Column

2 (in Column 2). The coefficients indicate that the historical

number of attacks has no significant e↵ect on the probability that a municipality will be
dissolved.
We also estimate a linear probability model for the hazard rate of the policy, that is the
probability of a municipality’s being dissolved at time t when it has never been dissolved
until then, as is common in duration analysis. In this case, the dependent variable Policy is
a dummy taking the value of 0 in the years before the city council dissolution in treated municipalities and 1 in the year of dissolution, and 0 in the control municipalities. Accordingly,
in these estimates we remove all the observations of treated municipalities after the year of
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dissolution. The results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table A.6 show that mafia-related violence
has no e↵ect on the conditional probability of a municipality’s being dissolved.
6.1.2

Investigation due to violent intimidation

As is noted in Section 3.1, violent intimidation of local politicians by organized crime can be
the starting point of the investigation by the Commissione d’Accesso, which could end in city
council dismissal. To address this issue, we reviewed the juridical literature (e.g. Marotta,
2019) that has used official reports to identify 31 municipalities whose dissolution procedure
in the period 2010-2018 was initiated because of evidence of a collusion between organized
crime and politicians accompanied by evidence of violent intimidation. These municipalities
are then excluded from the treatment group; the results of estimating Poisson FE model as
in eq. 2 and eq. 3 are reported in Figure B.4 and in Table A.7.
Consistent with the Granger causality test, the event study dummies confirm that the
common trend assumption is again verified and that the e↵ect of measure exhibits a pattern
similar to that in graph 4c in Figure 4. The comparison between the mean estimated e↵ect
of the measure Policy (by the Poisson FE procedure) in Column 7 of Table 3 and that in
Column 2 of Table A.7 o↵ers reassurance that the reverse causality does not substantially
bias our baseline estimates.

6.2

Omitted variable bias

Strict exogeneity of the treatment requires that the timing of treatment exposures in the
di↵-in-di↵ design must be statistically independent of the potential outcome distributions,
conditional on the group and time fixed e↵ects. We provide evidence of robustness to omitted
variable bias with a propensity score matching analysis and controls for important variables
that proxy for the level of government public security intervention.
6.2.1

Propensity score matching

The matching procedure first estimates a propensity score corresponding to the probability of
each municipality’s being treated, which is then regressed on covariates at the municipal level:
population, average female and male educational attainment, female and male unemployment
rates, a dummy for the sex of the mayor (1 if female) and the share of female politicians
within the city council.13
The goodness of the match for constructing a suitable control group is confirmed in
Figure B.5, which shows the distributions of the estimated propensity scores for the treated
municipalities (right-hand side) and the matched control municipalities (left-hand side).
Figure B.6 and Table A.8 show the estimation results of eq. 3 by the Poisson FE procedure. The baseline findings are confirmed despite the substantial reduction in the number
of observations, inevitable in propensity score matching. First of all, the common trend
assumption is definitely corroborated, as is shown by the insignificance of the coefficients
before the dissolution. The post-dissolution dynamic shows a significant negative e↵ect just
13

We use the Stata command psmatch2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
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after compulsory administration (t0 + 2 and t0 + 3). The estimates also display a durable
e↵ect of the measure, lasting at least until the second election afterwards.
Column 2 of Table A.8 shows that after a city council dissolution the number of attacks
decreases on average by 47% more in the treatment than in the control group. The coefficient
is a bit smaller (in absolute value) than that in the full sample estimates.
6.2.2

Controlling for government repressive action

According to the theoretical argument set out in Section 2, the reduction in violence against
politicians is an indirect e↵ect of the policy measure under examination, which is designed to
increase the cost of corruption (i.e., bribes) but not that of violent punishment, which would
require an expansion of law enforcement bodies. Thus government repression of criminal
activities through police forces could be an important source of omitted variable bias in our
analysis. The reduction in attacks in the treated relative to the untreated municipalities
after city council dissolution could be due to an increase in the police presence rather than
to the application of Law 164/1991.
To address this concern, let us note first that the application of the Law does not entail
police control of the city government in territories where organized crime is especially active.
Previous studies clearly show that owing to stringent budget constraints, neither police forces
nor funds for public security are increased during compulsory administration (Mete, 2009;
Cavaliere, 2004). In fact, examination of the national data reveals that both the number of
policemen and national expenditure for public security declined between 2010 and 2019.14
In any case, we address the concern over omitted variable bias statistically by controlling
for government repressive action. Data on central government control of the territory at
municipal level are not available,15 so we looked at the data of the Ministry of Interior on a
large number of crimes reported by police to the judicial authorities at provincial level from
2006 to 2019. These crimes – homicides, sexual abuses, fencing of stolen goods, extortion,
smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. – can be considered as a good proxy for central government
repressive action against criminality.16
However, the number of crimes reported can be a good proxy for government actions
against crime only if it is not a↵ected by the treatment itself (Wooldridge, 2005). To verify
this basic condition, we regress all of these crimes on our treatment variable. Since the
number of crimes is reported at province level, we construct the treatment variable as taking
value 1 if at least one municipality has been dissolved in the province, from the year of
dissolution onward, and 0 otherwise.
We estimate a panel FE model for all provinces (with both year and province FE), where
each of the 55 crimes recorded by the Ministry of the Interior is regressed one-by-one on the
treatment variable defined above. The estimates

17

allowed us to pick out 35 crimes that are

14

See the Eurostat website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat.
For example, national expenditure for police and number of policemen are confidential information, not
available at lower levels of government.
16
The analysis of Cingano and Tonello (2020) shows that crimes are a good proxy for government repressive
action. In fact, city council dissolution is associated with a persistent fall in thefts, but has no e↵ect on such
mafia-related crimes as homicide, extortion, drug trafficking, and usury.
17
Results are available upon request.
15

23
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1373 [2022]

not a↵ected by the treatment. We then estimated the Poisson FE model in the four regions of
Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily as in eq. 3, controlling for each of the crimes selected.
The coefficient associated with the treatment variable Policy remains negative and highly
significant.
Among the 35 felonies, ten — beatings, intentional injury, threats, corruption of minors,
robbery in homes, robbery in shops, car crime, art theft, robberies in post offices, and bombings — have a significant e↵ect on our outcome variable. For these crimes we report the
estimation results of the average impact of the measure in Table A.9, confirming the significant negative e↵ect of the dissolution measure on the level of violence against politicians.18
The magnitude of the coefficient associated with the variable Policy is very close to that
given in Table 3, further supporting the exogeneity of the treatment with respect to the
outcome variable.

7

Testing the exogeneity of the measure: IV approach

This Section presents additional statistical evidence of the exogeneity of the application
of Law 164 through a test based on the instrumental variables approach. The following
analysis relies on a robust complementary approach to the econometric issue of identification
of policy e↵ects (Besley and Case, 2000) and is quite new in the literature on the e↵ects
of Law 164/1991. First, we focus on variables that proxy for some relevant features of the
institutional decision-making process and then use them as IVs in the testing procedure
included in the control function approach (Blundell and Powell, 2003).

7.1

Factors a↵ecting city council dissolution

As is discussed at some length in Subsection 3, Law 164/1991 assigns a key role to the
Prefect, who chooses to start the investigation procedure by appointing the Commissione
d’Accesso on the grounds of preliminary evidence provided by the judiciary or the police.
The findings of the investigation then form the basis for the Prefect’s proposal to the Minister
of the Interior for city council dissolution. In short, it is the Prefect, as central government
representative in a province, who judges whether the evidence of the link between mafiatype organizations and local public officials justifies the dissolution of the city council. The
Prefect’s role in determining the final decision of national institutions is paramount.
Given the preventive character of Law 164/1991, the Prefect has to make the decision
on the basis of inferences and clues as to the infiltration of local politics by organized crime,
not necessarily evidence of crime as such. Hence, the choice to initiate the inquiry cannot
be based exclusively on the penal code but instead requires the subjective assessment of
the Prefect. This means that the latter’s personal characteristics are likely to influence the
decision to appoint the Commissione d’Accesso.
The Italian Ministry of Interior provides information on the gender, date and place of
birth of the Prefect in each province over the years. The Prefect’s gender may have an
e↵ect on application of Law 164, as women are generally believed to have higher ethical
18

The corresponding event study estimates are available upon request.

24
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1373

26

Baraldi et al.: Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of

standards than men and to be more concerned with the common good (Bolzendahl and
Co↵é, 2009, Dollar et al., 2001, Goetz, 2007). Also, women have been credited with a greater
propensity for altruistic and moral behavior (Eagly and Crowley, 1986, Eckel and Grossman,
1998, Glover et al., 1997) and with a more public-spirited attitude (Goertzel, 1983, Ones and
Viswesvaran, 1998), and are held to be more e↵ective in promoting honest government. In
line with this literature, we believe that female Prefects are inclined to be more severe in the
enforcement of Law 164 than their male counterparts.
The Prefect’s age too could a↵ect enforcement of the Law. The decision to dissolve a city
council is a risky one, as the Prefect could su↵er reputational damage for a wrong decision.
More experienced Prefects, during their careers, have presumably learned how to reduce
this risk and acquired a better capability to interpret the information produced by the local
political and criminal context. Older officials may also have more experience in detecting the
warning signs of mafia infiltration, drawing hints and clues from preliminary investigations.
Furthermore, older Prefects, towards the end of their career in civil service, may be more
inclined to “clean” the local territory of organized crime to the benefit of younger generations.
This form of inter-generational altruism can be intensified by a psychological attitude that
makes older people less tolerant of corruption (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 2000, Torgler and
Valev, 2006). These arguments suggest that the age of the Prefect may have a positive e↵ect
on the probability of a decision to dissolve a city council.
Finally, we can conjecture that civil servants who were born and raised in a territory
more severely plagued by organized crime may be more concerned with this social issue than
men and women from outside the area. Thus, one may well expect that Prefects from the
four regions studied here are more likely to formulate a dissolution proposal.
To sum up, our priors are that the probability of city council dissolution increases: 1) if
the Prefect of the province is female; 2) where the age of the Prefect is greater; and 3) where
the Prefect comes from Calabria, Campania, Puglia or Sicily.
Accordingly, we construct: 1) a dummy taking value 1 if the Prefect is a woman; 2) a
dummy for the age of the Prefect, subtracting from each year 2010-2019 the birth year of the
Prefetto (Age prefetto); 3) a dummy taking value 1 if the Prefect was born in a municipality
in Calabria, Campania, Publia or Sicily and 0 otherwise (Birth-place prefetto).
The endogeneity test exploits the control function approach, a two-stage IV procedure
that requires, first, regressing the potential endogenous variable (i.e., Policy) on all the
assumed exogenous explanatory variables and the instruments just defined; and second, using
the predicted residuals as an additional regressor in the main equation with the potential
endogenous variables.
The results from the first stage estimates are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: First stage estimations
Dep. Var.:
Sex prefect

(1)
Policy
-0.00155
(0.003)

Age prefect

(2)
Policy

(3)
Policy

0.00184***
(0.0005)

Birth-place prefect

(4)
Policy
0.0016
(0.003)
0.0019***
(0.0006)

0.00346
(0.003)

(5)
Policy

0.0017***
(0.0005)
0.0056
(0.003)

(6)
Policy
0.00199
(0.003)
0.00181***
(0.0006)
-0.00593*
(0.003)

Sex prefect*age prefect
No. observations
F-stat

15938
0.26

15938
13.08

15435
1.23

15938
6.63

15435
5.23

15435
3.53

(7)
Policy
-0.0289
(0.0705)
0.00171**
(0.0007)

0.000509
(-0.0012)
15938
4.76

Note. The table reports the coefficients of the first stage estimations: estimates of a linear equation where the dependent
variable is the dummy Policy (the endogenous one) over the regressors specified. All regressions include municipality FE, year
FE and population, whose coefficients are not reported. Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered at municipal level. Period:
2010-2019. F-stat refers to the Wald test of the null that the coefficients of the variables Sex prefect, Age prefect, Birth-place
prefect, and their interactions, are null. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).

The first-stage regressions strongly confirm the prior for age. Indeed, in Columns 2, 4, 5,
6 and 7, the coefficient of Age prefect is always positive and highly significant: the older
the Prefect, the higher the probability of city council dissolution. Place of birth, although
significant (weakly) only in Column 6, has the expected positive sign. Contrary to our
expectation, however, the gender of the Prefect does not a↵ect the probability of dissolution.
In Column 4 we add pairwise the Prefect’s age and gender and in Column 5 place pf birth;
Column 6 adds all the regressors together. Column 7 evaluates the combined e↵ect on the
dissolution of the age and the gender of the Prefect, constructing an interaction variable.
However, the estimated coefficient is not significantly di↵erent from zero.
The value of the F-statistic testing the relevance of the instruments is greater than 10
(the “rule of thumb”) only for the variable Age prefect (Column 2). Accordingly, we take
this as our instrumental variable for the computation of the endogeneity test.
As regards the exclusion restriction, no link is found between either the activity or the
personal characteristics of the Prefect and threats against local politicians by organized crime.
Therefore, the enforcement of the Law is a↵ected by the Prefect, whose action, however, is
not correlated with the dependent variable of our empirical model.

7.2

Testing exogeneity

As noted above, in order to control for the endogeneity of the measure (the variable Policy),
the control function procedure requires that the predicted values of the first-stage residuals,
as estimated in Table 5, be added to the set of the other explanatory variables in the secondstage estimates of the outcome variable. If the coefficient of the predicted residual is not
significantly di↵erent from zero, then the Policy variable can be considered exogenous.
Following Lin and Wooldridge (2019), we apply the OLS fixed e↵ects panel regression
to estimate the reduced form of Policy, including among the regressors Age prefect, and as
IV the municipal Population and the year dummies. In the second stage, the structural
eq. 3 for the number of mafia attacks, augmented with the predicted first-stage residuals, is
estimated using FE Poisson maximum likelihood. For both the first- and the second-stage
estimates, robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are bootstrapped. The
null hypothesis of a zero coefficient for first-stage residuals cannot be rejected (z = 0.39;
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P

value = 0.69), which provides support for the assumption of exogeneity of the city

council dissolution.
Although we found statistical evidence that Age prefect is a good instrument in the
reduced form equation of Policy (as in Column 2, Table 5), the fundamental requirement for
IV exogeneity, i.e. for the correct specification of the model, must be fulfilled. Accordingly,
as usual in the IV procedure, we perform the Hansen over-identification test, which requires
estimating the panel FE Poisson model as in eq. 3 using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). The variable Policy is assumed endogenous to the
number of mafia attacks; the instrumental variables are Age prefect and Sex prefect.19 The
estimate produces a J-statistic that suggests that the hypothesis that the model is correctly
specified cannot be rejected (J = 0.5338; P

value = 0.4650): the orthogonality conditions

hold.

8

Spillovers and Robustness

This Section presents additional evidence in support of our findings. To assess the overall
efficacy of Law 164 as an anti-mafia measure, we show the presence of spillover e↵ects of
city council dissolution on the level of violent intimidation in neighboring, undissolved municipalities. We refine our analysis by distinguishing among politicians by gender and office,
as well as among the types of attack. We also investigate whether the political orientation
of the local government makes a di↵erence for the e↵ect of the city council dismissal on the
number of attacks. Finally, we test whether dissolution unrelated to mafia infiltration a↵ects
our dependent variable.

8.1

Spillover e↵ects

Since it is plausible that mafias operate in an area larger than a single town, the shock
to mafia infiltration due to the enforcement of Law 164 in one municipality may generate
spillover e↵ects in neighboring towns. This prediction is also supported by Galletta (2017),
who shows the presence of spillover e↵ects due to the dissolution for mafia infiltration in
Calabria, Campania and Sicily in 1998-2013 in terms of a reduction in public investment.
The analysis of the spillover e↵ects also enables us to test the “Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption” (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1980), namely that the treatment status of one municipality
does not a↵ect outcomes for untreated municipalities — which is crucial to the validity of
the di↵-in-di↵ methodology; otherwise estimation could be biased.
In this respect, we estimate a Poisson FE model as in eq. 2 and eq. 3, taking as treated
municipalities those with at least one neighbor experiencing a city council dissolution in the
period 2010-2019; the control group comprises all the other municipalities except the dissolved
ones that are excluded from the analysis.20 The neighboring municipalities are assumed to
start receiving the treatment in the year of the near-by municipality’s dissolution. The results
19

The F-test on both variables in the estimates of the reduced form as in Column 4, Table 5, shows a value
that satisfies the requirement.
20
Our source for selection of the neighboring municipalities is the “Matrici di contiguità, distanza e pendolarismo” database provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics (IST AT ).
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are shown in Figure B.7 and Table A.10, where the dependent variable is the total number
of attacks against politicians by year.
Graphs B.7a and B.7b show the event study estimates of the Poisson FE model with
standard errors clustered at municipal and provincial level, respectively.21 The common
trend assumption continues to hold for neighboring municipalities. The dynamic of the
number of attacks suggests that for neighboring municipalities too the measure substantially
reduces organized criminal violence against politicians. Interestingly, the trajectory of the
attacks in neighboring municipalities displays a lagged response to the dissolution. Although
all the post-treatment coefficients are negative, they are not significant until t0 + 3 and t0 + 4
(columns 1 and 2, Table A.10). Also for neighboring municipalities, the e↵ect of the measure
is long-lasting, as strongly significant coefficients persist up to t0 + 9.
Columns 3 and 4 Table A.10 shows the average treatment e↵ect on attacks against politicians in neighboring municipalities. Given the two-year lag in the response to a dissolution
in a neighboring municipality, we construct the treatment dummy Policy (for neighboring
municipalities), which takes value 1 in the second year after the dissolution of the neighbour
municipality onward and 0 for other years. The shock to the political infiltration of mafiatype organizations due to the enforcement of Law 164 reduces mafia attacks in the neighbors
of the dissolved municipalities by 25.6%.
The verified presence of municipality spillovers means the SUTVA assumption is violated,
so the baseline estimates could be biased, because these neighboring municipalities are part
of the control group. In order to correct for this bias in our original estimates, we exclude
these neighboring municipalities from the control group. The results are presented in Figure
B.8 and Table A.11. They confirm both the validity of the common trend assumption and
the dynamics of the dependent variable.
Comparison of the average treatment e↵ect in Column 7 of Table 3 and that in Column
2 of Table A.11 shows a clear underestimation of the coefficient of Policy, confirming the
violation of the SUTVA in our initial results. Correcting for the spillover e↵ects, the mean
e↵ect of the measure in reducing the number of attacks comes to 56.4%.

8.2

Types of politician and attacks

In this section, we provide some additional evidence confirming our main findings. We first
investigate whether politicians’ gender matters for the use of violence by organized crime. In
the sample period, the average share of women in city councils is 21% and of female aldermen,
25%, female councillors 22% and female mayors, 5.7%. While this descriptive evidence
suggests greater male participation in politics, women might be di↵erentially engaged in
sectors targeted by organized crime and thus more likely to be victims of attack. Columns
1 and 2 of Table A.12 do not confirm this thesis; instead, there is a significant and negative
average impact of Law 164 for male politicians only: after the dissolution because of mafia
infiltration, the number of attacks against men drops by an average of 58% more in the
treatment than in the control group (Column 1). Using both these subsets of politicians, the
trend of attacks is substantially confirmed for men (see graph B.9a of Figure B.9), with a
21

To analyse spillover e↵ects, clustering at province level is also very important.
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reduction of some 81% ( 1.69 in the figure) in the number of attacks in the year of the first
election after compulsory administration (t0 + 2). However, there is considerable volatility in
the coefficients in the graph B.9b referring to female politicians, owing to the small number
of attacks in this subgroup.
We replicate our analysis by distinguishing among di↵erent kinds of politician. As is
shown in Figure 3, the targets of mafia attacks are city council politicians as well as politicians
outside local government. In this respect, we evaluate the e↵ectiveness of Law 164 over the
two groups of politicians: City council politicians, including mayors, councillors, aldermen
and deputy mayors; Other politicians, comprising regional councillors, regional presidents,
former mayors, candidates and representatives of other institutions and institutional entities.
The estimation results are given in Columns 3 and 4 of Table A.12 respectively for the two
sets of politicians. The policy a↵ected only city council politicians, and the attacks on them
after the compulsory administration declined on average by 46% more in the treatment than
the control group. Graph B.9c in Figure B.9 shows that the sharper reduction in the attacks
on city council politicians occurs in the second elections after compulsory administration
(that is, in t0 + 6 and t0 + 7) rather than in the first election.22 Along the same lines, we also
consider attacks against mayors only. Similarly, for them, the Poisson FE coefficient suggests
a decrease of 82% in the number of attacks immediately after compulsory administration.
The elasticity of the average treatment e↵ect over the entire period is about 45% for the
number of attacks against mayors.
We also investigate whether Law 164 is e↵ective in reducing both threats and violence,
which are the main instruments of violent intimidation, as detailed in Figure 2. In this
respect, we split the types of attack into the two categories of Threats and Violence. We
define as Threats the following: threatening letters, threatening letters containing bullets,
verbal or telephone threats, bullets left in front of a politician’s home, threatening messages
on the family tomb, bullets left in front of the home or City Hall, and threatening messages
on the walls of the home or City Hall. We define as Violence: setting fire to car, City Hall,
home or municipal property, physical assault, shootings against City Hall, homicide, killing
of domestic animals, delivery of animal head in a box, shootings against cars, leaving dead
animals or their parts in front of the home, damage or robbery inside City Hall, felling of
trees on private property, physical assault in public places, bombings of home or City Hall.
This distinction also allows us to overcome, at least partially, the measurement error of the
dependent variables due to the possibility of under-reporting. For while threats may be
hidden, outright violence is visible and, thus, unlikely to go unreported. Columns 6 and 7
of Table A.12 show the e↵ect of the measure for the two categories of attack respectively.
While the coefficient for Threats is not significant, textitViolence is reduced on average by
45% more in the treatment than in the control group. The event study graph in B.9g of
Figure B.9 confirms the inverted u-shaped trajectory of the subset of Violence following
the Law’s application in the treated compared with the untreated municipalities. Here, the
highest coefficient is recorded at t0 + 3, with a decrease in visible attacks of 78%( 1.51 in
the graph). The coefficients of Threats in graph B.9f are also quite volatile, owing to the
22

In graph B.9d the considerable volatility of the coefficients is due to the very low number of attacks on
non-city-council politicians.
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very small size of this sub-sample.
As noted in Section 4.1, the number of attacks according to “Avviso Pubblico” corresponds to those reported in the media. For example, as is suggested by Daniele and Dipoppa
(2017), news of attacks may depend on the electoral period. Although these possible measurement errors concerning the dependent variable (see Subsection 3.3) are not a real concern
in the empirical analysis, we replicate previous findings by considering the most salient attacks, defined as those most likely to gain media attention (cars burned, physical assaults,
homicides, shootings against cars). Figure B.9 and Column 8 of Table A.12 show the estimation results of the preferred Poisson FE model, which are substantially similar to the
baseline findings. The di↵erence in the decrease in salient attacks between the dissolved
municipalities and the control group peaks at t0 + 3 after treatment, with an elasticity of
85% (column 1). The elasticity of the average treatment e↵ect over the entire period is about
47%.

8.3

Political party in power

In view of the literature that has documented that mafias are more connected with centerright parties Buonanno et al. (2016), we assess whether our results are a↵ected by the political
orientation of the victims. In Italy, at local level, only in the largest municipalities is the
electoral competition between national parties with a well-defined political orientation. In
most municipalities, instead, it is between civic lists, often with no clear political orientation.
Applying a broader code of center-right and center-left parties, we divide the parties
in local government into three categories: parties and civic lists of right and center-right
(i.e., all those whose names contain words clearly ascribable to a rightist political group Center-right), parties and civic lists of left and center-left (i.e., those with names containing
words clearly ascribable to a leftist political group - Center-left), and parties and civic lists
with no definite political orientation (Civic lists). In our sample of municipalities, 83.74% of
municipal administrations are headed by civic list mayors, 9.63% by center-left mayors and
the remaining 6.57% by center-right mayors.
According to this broader coding, in the Poisson FE estimations as in eq.2 and 3 we
control for the dummies Center-right, Center-left and Civic lists.23 The results (Figure B.10
and Table A.13) are consistent with the baseline, and they indicate that the mayors’ political
orientation does not a↵ect the outcome variable.

8.4

Placebo test on governments dissolved for reasons unrelated to mafia
infiltration

As a further support to our findings, we run a placebo test on municipalities dissolved for
reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration, which is a quite common occurrence (see subsection
4.1).
We estimate Poisson FE as in eq. 2, considering the dynamics of the number of attacks
in municipalities dissolved for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration before and after the city
23

Given that the Poisson FE algorithm does not estimate the constant term, we can add all the dummies
without falling into the dummy variable trap.
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council dismissal. Obviously municipalities dissolved for mafia infiltration are excluded.
Figure B.11 shows the year-by-year Poisson FE estimated coefficients, which are not
statistically di↵erent from zero. In short, the number of attacks against local politicians is
plainly not significantly a↵ected by city council dissolution per se.

9

Conclusions

This paper o↵ers an empirical measure of the efficacy of Law 164/1991 for city council
dissolution in cases of mafia infiltration in preserving public security by deterring organized
crime from violent intimidation to influence local politics.
We referred to Dal Bó et al. (2006)’s model. In this framework, law enforcement aimed at
increasing the cost of corruption without expanding the police presence could in theory induce
criminal organizations to shift from corruption to violent intimidation, thereby increasing the
level of violence; or, on the other hand, it could have an overall negative e↵ect on violence
against politicians if it induces enough criminal groups to switch to inactivity. In substance,
empirical analysis of the e↵ect of Law 164/1991 on organized criminal violence against local
politicians is essential to assessing its e↵ectiveness in raising entry barriers to the mafias’
“business” of influencing politics.
Our di↵-in-di↵ analysis demonstrates that the enforcement of Law 164/1991 reduces the
number of attacks against politicians substantially, with an e↵ect that persists for at least
the first two elections after compulsory administration. To evaluate the Law’s e↵ectiveness in preserving public security in a broader sense, we provide evidence that city council
dissolutions also have appreciable spillover e↵ects, lowering the number of attacks also in
neighboring, undissolved municipalities. We validate the assumption of the exogeneity of the
treatment to the outcome by controlling for reverse causality and omitted variable bias, and
by an instrumental variable approach.
This paper makes two key contributions to the literature. First, it addresses the possibly
ambivalent e↵ect of a positive shock to the cost of corruption as highlighted in Dal Bó et al.
(2006) by showing that the enforcement of Law 164/1991 is e↵ective in raising the barriers
to entry into the business of influencing politics, so as to induce criminal clans to reduce
violence against politicians. Second, it adds to the substantial literature on the e↵ects of
Law 164/1991, with novel empirical evidence that the Law’s enforcement diminishes mafia
violence against politicians. In this regard our results expand on recent studies documenting the e↵ectiveness of city council dissolution in terms of long-run economic performance
(Fenizia and Saggio, 2022), female political empowerment (Baraldi and Ronza, 2022), the
quality of elected officials (Daniele and Geys, 2015), and the allocation of public resources
and tax collection (Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco, 2021). Finally, since several studies have
shown that repressive policies bring about a violent reprisal from criminal organizations (e.g.,
Calderón et al., 2015; Castillo and Kronick, 2020), our analysis contributes to the literature
that analyses empirically the e↵ectiveness of non-repressive government measures in fighting
organized crime activities (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2022).
From the normative perspective, while city council dismissal is meant to be an ad hoc
measure responding to specific circumstances within the local government, the persistence of
31
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the dampening e↵ect on violence against local politicians up to at least the second electoral
round after compulsory administration is powerful evidence of the medium-run efficacy of
Law 164/1991 in restoring the autonomy of the local government and local public security.
The evidence presented here is in line with Daniele and Dipoppa (2017) and Alesina
et al. (2019). The sine curve of the post-treatment coefficients between the first two elections
after compulsory administration is consistent with the thesis that the electoral pressure
exerted by criminal clans is a consequence of violent intimidation against politicians as a
mechanism of reinforcement of corruption. Our findings document the efficacy of the city
council dissolution in deterring violence by organized crime precisely when it would be of the
greatest strategic value in wielding political influence. This helps clarify the way in which
criminal organizations redirect public resources to their own advantage.
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d’inchiesta sul fenomeno delle intimidazioni nei confronti degli amministratori locali, relazione conclusiva. Senato della Repubblica Italiana.
Olivieri, E. and S. Sberna (2014). Set the night on fire! Mafia violence and elections in Italy.
APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper .
Ones, D. S. and C. Viswesvaran (1998). Gender, age, and race di↵erences on overt integrity
tests: Results across four large-scale job applicant datasets. Journal of Applied Psychology 83 (1), 35.
Rubin, D. B. (1980). Randomization analysis of experimental data: The fisher randomization
test comment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 75 (371), 591–593.
Sviatschi, M. M. (2019). Us criminal deportations and human capital in central america. In
AEA Papers and Proceedings, Volume 109, pp. 239–42.
Swamy, A., S. Knack, Y. Lee, and O. Azfar (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of
Development Economics 64 (1), 25–55.
Torgler, B. and N. T. Valev (2006). Corruption and age. Journal of bioeconomics 8 (2),
133–145.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2005). Violating ignorability of treatment by controlling for too many
factors. Econometric Theory 21 (5), 1026–1028.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press.

36
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1373

38

Baraldi et al.: Neutralizing the Tentacles of Organized Crime. Assessment of

APPENDIX

A

Tables
Table A.1: Mean of attacks on politicians by region
Regions
Abruzzo
Basilicata
Calabria
Campania
Emilia Romagna
Friuli Venezia Giulia
Lazio
Liguria
Lombardy
Marche
Molise
Piedmont
Puglia
Sardinia
Sicily
Tuscany
Trentino Alto Adige
Umbria
Valle D’Aosta
Veneto

All politicians
(1)
1.55
1.66
2.39
2.29
1.81
1.06
2.76
2.07
1.62
1.05
1.20
1.80
2.28
1.93
2.66
1.74
0.82
0.85
1.00
1.70

All politicians/Pop
(2)
0.00389
0.011588
0.004972
0.002642
0.001324
0.002163
0.00253
0.002915
0.000657
0.002209
0.010791
0.001747
0.002704
0.00477
0.002949
0.001644
0.002947
0.002943
0.031447
0.00142

Note. The table gives the number of dissolved administrations among
those elected from 1991 to 2016 in Italy by region. Piedmont, Lombardy, Lazio, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, and Basilicata had 1 dissolution each.

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Attacks
Pop
Female education
Male education
Female unemployment
Male unemployment
Mayor degree
Councillors degree
Aldermen degree
No. female councillors
No. male councillors

Obs
16080
15982
11207
11207
11207
11207
16080
16080
16080
15938
15938

Mean
0.17
10.396
0.838
0.886
0.233
0.155
0.574
0.005
0.085
2.685
0.919

Std.Dev.
0.841
35.018
0.043
0.029
0.076
0.051
0.495
0.069
0.279
2.23
0.882

Min
0
0.158
0.635
0.756
0.014
0.014
0
0
0
0
0

Max
21
989.111
0.929
0.962
0.537
0.351
1
1
1
14
5

Notes. Descriptive statistics of variables. Population in thousands. Period: 2010-2019.
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Table A.3: Distribution of attacks
No. Attacks
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
17
18
21
Total

Frequency
14,942
462
341
151
60
47
22
11
16
9
3
3
5
4
1
1
1
1
16,080

Percentage
92.92
2.87
2.12
0.94
0.37
0.29
0.14
0.07
0.1
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
100

Cumulative
92.92
95.8
97.92
98.86
99.23
99.52
99.66
99.73
99.83
99.88
99.9
99.92
99.95
99.98
99.98
99.99
99.99
100

Notes. Distribution of number of attacks against politicians
in each municipality. Period: 2010-2019.

Table A.4: Poisson RE estimations
Dep. Var.:
Policy
Ln(Pop)

(1)
No. Attacks
0.465**
(0.220)
0.817***
(0.0422)

(2)
No. Attacks
-0.563***
(0.201)
0.930***
(0.0400)

(3)
No. Attacks
-0.709***
(0.224)
0.848***
(0.0543)
8.822***
(3.031)
-13.90***
(4.211)
0.536
(1.593)
1.536
(2.491)

16,002
1,606
Yes

16,002
1,606
Yes
Yes

11,217
1,603
Yes
Yes

Female education
Male education
Female unemployment
Male unemployment

Observations
No. municipalities
Year FE
Province FE

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to eq. 3 by Poisson RE
model. The dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians.
Column 2 includes province FE; Column 3 adds municipality controls: Female
education, Male education, Female unemployment and Male unemployment. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Policy is a dummy taking the value
of 1 for all the years from the dissolution onward and 0 for previous years. All
regressions include municipality FE, year FE, and population (in log). The coefficients of municipality FE, year FE, and province FE are not reported. Standard
errors are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by
* (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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Table A.5: Excluding 2012
(1)
No. attacks
-1.638***
(0.462)
-1.041**
(0.510)
-0.745**
(0.340)
-1.046***
(0.398)
-1.183**
(0.480)

Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 6
t0 + 7
t0 + 8
Policy
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(2)
No. attacks

0.00855
(0.00985)

-0.690***
(0.200)
0.00925
(0.0101)

5,094
568
Yes
Yes

5,094
568
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson FE
model in eq. 2 (in Column 1) and in eq. 3 (in Column 2). We drop the
year 2012. The dependent variable is total number of attacks against
politicians. In estimating eq. 2 in Column 1 we include event-time
dummy variables for 6 years before and 8 years after the dissolution;
the omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We report only the
event study dummies that are significantly di↵erent from 0. Policy is
a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from the dissolution
onward and 0 for previous years. The coefficients of municipality FE
and year FE are not reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant
coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1%
level).

Table A.6: Granger causality
Dep. Var.:
Attacks
Attacks

1

Attacks

2

Observations
R-squared
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(1)
Policy
-0.00335
(0.00226)
-0.00218
(0.00198)
-0.000300
(0.00211)
12,796
0.028
1,606
Yes
Yes

(2)
Policy

-0.00189
(0.00185)
-1.31e-06
(0.00205)

(3)
Policy
-0.000170
(0.00160)
6.33e-05
(0.00158)
0.00258
(0.00195)

(4)
Policy

7.91e-05
(0.00159)
0.00260
(0.00197)

12,796
0.028
1,606
Yes
Yes

12,400
0.008
1,599
Yes
Yes

12,400
0.008
1,599
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients of panel FE estimations. For estimations in
Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable, Policy, is a dummy taking the value of
1 for all the years from the first year after compulsory administration to the end
of the period and 0 for previous years. In Columns 3 and 4 Policy is a dummy
taking the value of 1 in treated municipalities for the years of dissolution only
and 0 previously, and 0 for untreated municipalities. Attacks is the total
number attacks in municipality i. All regressions include municipality FE,
year FE, and population, whose coefficients are not reported. Robust standard
errors are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated
by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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Table A.7: Investigation due to violent intimidation
Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 6
t0 + 7
t0 + 8

(1)
No. attacks
-1.373**
(0.596)
-1.119**
(0.540)
-0.834**
(0.373)
-0.947**
(0.446)
-1.021**
(0.510)

Policy

-0.708***
(0.269)
0.0101
(0.0104)

Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(2)
No. attacks

5,491
551
Yes
Yes

5,491
551
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson FE
model in eq. 2 (in Column 1) and in eq. 3 (in Column 2). We exclude
from the treatment group the 31 municipalities where the investigation
was initiated also for violent intimidation. The dependent variable is
the total number of attacks against politicians. In estimating eq. 2 in
Column 1 we include event-time dummy variables for 6 years before
and 8 years after the dissolution; the omitted category is the year of
dissolution (t0 ). We report only the event study dummies that are significantly di↵erent from 0. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for
all the years from the dissolution onward and 0 for previous years. The
coefficients of municipality FE and year FE are not reported. Standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level),
** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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Table A.8: Propensity score matching
(1)
No. attacks
-1.384***
(0.475)
-0.885**
(0.411)
-0.923*
(0.493)

Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 7
t0 + 8

(2)
No. attacks

Policy
Pop

0.00941
(0.0104)

-0.632***
(0.197)
0.00984
(0.0107)

3,281
329
Yes
Yes

3,281
329
Yes
Yes

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson FE
model in eq. 2 (in Column 1) and in eq. 3 (in Column 2) on the matched
control sample of municipalities. The dependent variable is the total
number of attacks against politicians. In estimating eq. 2 in Column 1
we include event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 8 years
after the dissolution; the omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ).
We report only the event study dummies that are significantly di↵erent
from 0. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years
from the dissolution onward and 0 for previous years. The coefficients
of municipality FE and year FE are not reported. Standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the municipal level are in brackets. Period:
2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), **
(5% level) and *** (1% level).

Table A.9: Controlling for crimes
Dep. Var.:
Policy
Beatings

(1)
Attacks
-0.655***
(0.212)
0.00237**
(0.00112)

Intentional injury

(2)
Attacks
-0.634***
(0.209)

(3)
Attacks
-0.651***
(0.213)

(4)
Attacks
-0.618***
(0.212)

(5)
Attacks
-0.664***
(0.213)

(6)
Attacks
-0.636***
(0.211)

(7)
Attacks
-0.635***
(0.211)

(8)
Attacks
-0.622***
(0.213)

(9)
Attacks
-0.628***
(0.214)

-0.0131**
(0.00553)

(11)
Attacks
-0.650***
(0.218)
0.00312**
(0.00154)
-0.000872
(0.000796)
2.73e-05
(0.000493)
0.0387
(0.0244)
0.000374**
(0.000162)
0.000630**
(0.000319)
0.000152
(0.000149)
-0.00510
(0.0115)
-0.0214***
(0.00759)
-0.00876
(0.00626)

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

0.000711**
(0.000322)

Threats

0.000494**
(0.000231)

Corruption m.

0.0565**
(0.0223)

House robbery

0.000379***
(0.000132)

Shop robbery

0.000674**
(0.000298)

Car crime

0.000236***
(8.62e-05)

Art theft

-0.0168*
(0.00875)

Robberies in P.O.

-0.0157**
(0.00735)

Bombings

Observations
Number of new id
Municipality FE
Year FE

(10)
Attacks
-0.614***
(0.210)

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

5,697
574
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson FE model in eq. 2 (in Columns 1-5) and in eq. 3 (in Columns 6-10). The dependent variable is the total number of
attacks against politicians. In Columns 1 and 6 we control for number of infanticides; in Columns 2 and 7, for the number of cases of corruption of minors; Columns 3 and 8, number
of mafia-type criminal organizations; Columns 4 and 9, number of cases of drug production and trafficking; Columns 5 and 10, all those crimes together. Crimes are at province level in
2010-2016. We report only the event study dummies that are significantly di↵erent from 0. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from the dissolution onward and 0
for previous years. The coefficients of municipality FE and year FE are not reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019.
Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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Table A.10: Spillovers
(1)
No. Attacks
-0.429*
(0.242)
-0.470**
(0.233)
-0.524**
(0.223)
-0.426
(0.261)
-1.363***
(0.465)

Dep. Var.:
t0 + 3
t0 + 4
t0 + 6
t0 + 8
t0 + 9

(2)
No. Attacks
-0.429***
(0.155)
-0.470***
(0.133)
-0.524**
(0.233)
-0.426*
(0.252)
-1.363**
(0.557)

Policy
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(3)
No. Attacks

(4)
No. Attacks

-0.296*
(0.168)
0.0139
(0.0126)
5,454
547
Yes
Yes

0.0145
(0.0109)

0.0145
(0.0116)

-0.296**
(0.145)
0.0139
(0.0115)

5,454
547
Yes
Yes

5,454
547
Yes
Yes

5,454
547
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson FE model in eq. 2. The
dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians. Policy is a dummy
taking the value of 1 from the second year after the dissolution onward and 0 for other years.
All estimations include municipality FE and year FE, whose coefficients are not reported.
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the municipal level; they are in brackets.
Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and
*** (1% level).

Table A.11: Excluding neighboring municipalities
Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 4
t0 + 6
t0 + 7
t0 + 8

(1)
No. attacks
-1.832***
(0.473)
-1.182**
(0.514)
-0.807**
(0.394)
-0.952***
(0.346)
-1.272***
(0.402)
-1.401***
(0.499)

Policy
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(2)
No. attacks

0.0210
(0.0301)

-0.831***
(0.214)
0.0400
(0.0345)

3,731
465
Yes
Yes

3,731
465
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson
FE model in eq. 2 (in Column 1) and in eq. 3 (in Column 2). We
exclude from the control group the municipalities neighboring those
dissolved. The dependent variable is the total number of attacks against
politicians. In estimating eq. 2 in Column 1 we include event-time
dummy variables for 5 years before and 8 years after the dissolution;
the omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We report only the
event study dummies that are significantly di↵erent from 0. Policy is
a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from the dissolution
onward and 0 for previous years. The coefficients of municipality FE
and year FE are not reported. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant
coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1%
level).
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Table A.12: Types of politician and attack
No. Attacks
Policy
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(1)
Male
politicians
-0.865***
(0.188)
0.00728
(0.0101)

(2)
Female
politicians
-0.807
(0.589)
0.0516*
(0.0296)

(3)
City council
politicians
-0.608**
(0.261)
0.0399**
(0.0174)

(4)
Other
politicians
0.0446
(0.273)
-0.0220
(0.0141)

(5)
Mayor

(6)
Threats

(7)
Violence

-0.604**
(0.281)
0.0371
(0.0241)

-0.157
(0.336)
0.0295*
(0.0170)

-0.592**
(0.271)
0.00536
(0.0158)

(8)
Salient
politicians
-0.643**
(0.288)
0.0141
(0.0225)

5,964
598
Yes
Yes

877
88
Yes
Yes

5,514
553
Yes
Yes

3,514
353
Yes
Yes

4,624
464
Yes
Yes

3,011
302
Yes
Yes

4,721
473
Yes
Yes

3,391
395
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to eq. 3 by Poisson FE model. Column 1 shows estimates when the dependent
variable is the total number of attacks against male politicians. Column 2 shows estimates when the dependent variable is the total
number of attacks against female politicians; Column 3, total number of attacks against city council politicians; Column 5, total number
of attacks against mayors. Column 6 shows estimates when the dependent variable is the total number of threats against politicians.
Column 7 shows estimates when the dependent variable is the total number of instances of actual violence against politicians, and
Column 8 the total number of salient attacks. Policy is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all the years from the first after compulsory
administration to the end of the period and 0 for previous years. The coefficients of municipality FE and year FE are not reported.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipal level are in brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated
by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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Table A.13: Political party of administration
Dep. Var.:
t0 + 2
t0 + 3
t0 + 6
t0 + 7
t0 + 8

(1)
No. attacks
-1.429***
(0.500)
-0.851*
(0.508)
-0.658*
(0.340)
-0.917**
(0.404)
-1.052**
(0.496)

Policy
Center-right
Center-left
Civic lists
Pop

Observations
No. municipalities
Municipality FE
Year FE

(2)
No. attacks

0.0564
(0.148)
0.230
(0.143)
0.0241
(0.115)
0.00683
(0.00856)

-0.673***
(0.210)
0.0669
(0.146)
0.261*
(0.145)
0.0423
(0.111)
0.00709
(0.00882)

5,731
575
Yes
Yes

5,731
575
Yes
Yes

Note. The table reports coefficients estimated according to Poisson
FE model in eq. 2 (in Column 1) and in eq. 3 (in Column 2). The
dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians.
We control for dummies for mayor’s party affiliation. In estimating
eq. 2 in Column 1 we include event-time dummy variables for 7 years
before and 8 years after the dissolution; the omitted category is the
year of dissolution (t0 ). We report only the event study dummies that
are significantly di↵erent from 0. Policy is a dummy taking the value
of 1 for all the years from the dissolution onward and 0 for previous
years. The coefficients of municipality FE and year FE are not reported.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the municipal level are in
brackets. Period: 2010-2019. Significant coefficients are indicated by *
(10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level).
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B

Figures
Figure B.1: Yearly distribution of attacks
(a) By type of attack

(b) By type of politician

Note. The Figure shows the trend in the mean, over municipalities, of attacks against politicians. 20102019. Graph B.1a shows the trend in the total number of attacks and split into Threats (threatening letters,
threatening letters containing bullets, verbal or telephone threats, bullets left in front of a politician’s home,
threatening messages on family tomb, bullets in front of home or City Hall, threatening messages on the
walls of the home or City Hall) and actual Violence (car burning, burning of City Hall or municipal property,
physical assault, burning of home, shooting against City Hall, homicide, killing of domestic animals, delivery
of animal head in a box, shootings against car, leaving dead animals or their parts in front of home, damage or
robbery in City Hall, felling of trees on private property, physical assault in public places, bombings of home or
City Hall). Graph B.1b shows the trend of attacks on City council politicians (mayor, councillors, aldermen,
deputy mayor) and Other politicians (regional councillors, regional presidents, former mayors, candidates and
representatives of other institutions and entities).

Figure B.2: Dissolutions by year and province
(a) By year

(b) By province

Note. Graphs B.2a and B.2b show the distribution of city council dissolutions for mafia infiltration, by year
and by province, respectively, in Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily.
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Figure B.3: Excluding 2012 - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Poisson FE model
estimates, dependent variable is total number attacks. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer to
point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include
event-time dummy variables for 6 years before and 8 years after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality
FE, year FE, and population. Period: 2010-2019.

Figure B.4: Investigation due to violent intimidation - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2 by Poisson FE model. The
dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians. We exclude from the sample of treatment units
municipalities where the dissolution procedure was initiated owing to attacks against politicians in office. Standard
errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted
category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time dummy variables for 6 years before and 8 years after the
dissolution. All regressions include municipality FE, year FE and population.
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Figure B.5: Overlap in propensity scores in treated and matched samples

Notes. Distributions of the estimated propensity scores of dissolved municipalities for the treatment group (i.e. all
municipalities put under compulsory administration; right-hand side) and the control group (i.e. the ”nearest neighbor”
of treated municipalities as derived from the matching procedure; left-hand side). 2010-2019.

Figure B.6: Propensity score matching - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2 by Poisson FE model. The
dependent variable is the total number of attacks against politicians. Sample of treatment units excludes municipalities
whose dissolution procedure was initiated owing to attacks against politicians in office. Standard errors are clustered
at municipal level. Dots refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year
of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 8 years after the dissolution. All
regressions include municipality FE, year FE, and population.
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Figure B.7: Spillovers - Event study
(a) Poisson FE (municipality cluster)

(b) Poisson FE (province cluster)

Note. The graphs report coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Graphs show the
Poisson FE model estimates where the dependent variable is the total number attacks. Standard errors are
clustered at municipal level in graph B.7a and at province level in graph B.7b. Dots refer to point estimates,
spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time
dummy variables for 7 years before and 10 years after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality
FE, year FE, and population. Period: 2010-2019.

Figure B.8: Excluding neighboring municipalities - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Poisson FE model estimates,
dependent variable is total number attacks. Control group excludes municipalities neighboring dissolved municipalities.
Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The
omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time dummy variables for 5 years before and 8 years
after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality FE, year FE, and population. Period: 2010-2019.
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Figure B.9: Types of politician and attack - Event study
(a)

Male politicians

(e)

Mayors

(b)

(c)

Female politicians

(f)

City council politicians

(g)

Threats

Violence

(d)

(h)

Other politicians

Salient attacks

Note. The graphs report coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2 by Poisson FE
model. Graph B.9a shows estimates when dependent variable is total number of attacks against male politicians. Graph B.9b: dependent variable is total number of attacks against female politicians. Graph B.9c:
total attacks against city council politicians. Graph B.9d: total attacks against other politicians. Graph
B.9e: dependent variable is total number of threats against mayors. Graph B.9f shows estimates when the
dependent variable is the total number of threats against politicians. Graph B.9g: dependent variable is total
acts of violence against politicians. Graph B.9h: total number salient attacks against politicians. Standard
errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The
omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include event-time dummy variables for 7 years before
and 8 years after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality FE, year FE, and population.

Figure B.10: Political party holding the administration - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Poisson FE model estimates
where the dependent variable is the total number attacks. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer
to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include
event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 8 years after the dissolution. We control for dummies on mayor’s
party affiliation. All regressions include municipality FE, year FE, and population. Period: 2010-2019.
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Figure B.11: Dissolutions unrelated to mafia infiltration - Event study

Notes. The graph reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated according to eq. 2. Poisson FE model estimates
where the dependent variable is the total number attacks. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Dots refer
to point estimates, spikes to 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the year of dissolution (t0 ). We include
event-time dummy variables for 7 years before and 7 years after the dissolution. All regressions include municipality
FE, year FE, and population. Period: 2010-2019.
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